I’m aware of how short-sighted and unstable the U.S. is, but bipartisan goals in this country can survive years and years of “leadership changes” is my concern.
The U.S. instability and division can actually somewhat frustratingly work it it’s favor, by keeping the masses distracted and angry and divided and fearful, further cementing the rule of the capitalists and imperial hegemony, and cause people to become even further supporters of Amerikkkan imperialism.
My concern is that Russia turning on China, while being an unlikely possibility, is way above a remote possibility. If I had to guess, maybe it’s a 1.5-10 or 20 percent. Even 1.5 percent is too high for my tastes.
I think that fortunately, Russia has very little reason to turn towards the west, and that even the lifting of sanctions or being allowed back into SWIFT isn’t nearly enough to persuade Russia back. It would take multiple acts of god for Russia to even slightly turn back to the west, let alone distance itself from, let alone betray China.
Alot of times in politics and probability and thought, it’s not the very likely and very unlikely things that concern me. It’s the unlikely things. Even a 1 or two percent chance can end up feeling more like 30 percent.
Exactly, it’s not so much that Russia is loyal to China but rather that the west has precious little to offer. I do think that this sort of political variability is more prevalent in the west however. Russian and Chinese politics are much more stable in nature, and hence there tends to be a lot less surprise upsets of the sort we see in the west.
I’m aware of how short-sighted and unstable the U.S. is, but bipartisan goals in this country can survive years and years of “leadership changes” is my concern.
The U.S. instability and division can actually somewhat frustratingly work it it’s favor, by keeping the masses distracted and angry and divided and fearful, further cementing the rule of the capitalists and imperial hegemony, and cause people to become even further supporters of Amerikkkan imperialism.
My concern is that Russia turning on China, while being an unlikely possibility, is way above a remote possibility. If I had to guess, maybe it’s a 1.5-10 or 20 percent. Even 1.5 percent is too high for my tastes.
I think that fortunately, Russia has very little reason to turn towards the west, and that even the lifting of sanctions or being allowed back into SWIFT isn’t nearly enough to persuade Russia back. It would take multiple acts of god for Russia to even slightly turn back to the west, let alone distance itself from, let alone betray China.
Alot of times in politics and probability and thought, it’s not the very likely and very unlikely things that concern me. It’s the unlikely things. Even a 1 or two percent chance can end up feeling more like 30 percent.
Exactly, it’s not so much that Russia is loyal to China but rather that the west has precious little to offer. I do think that this sort of political variability is more prevalent in the west however. Russian and Chinese politics are much more stable in nature, and hence there tends to be a lot less surprise upsets of the sort we see in the west.
I would argue that Russia does have a sense of loyalty to China, but it’s not as rock solid as it should be IMO.
Russia tends to be fairly good at keeping their commitments in general. So, I can’t really see them stabbing China in the back here.