The RF inherited from the USSR not only the legacy of anti-imperialism, but the legacy of naivety.

From: Yuliana Dlugaj @DlugajJuly

Moscow’s Strategic Missteps: A Two-Decade Pattern of Misjudgment

The unfolding crisis in Syria is yet another stark example of a recurring flaw in Moscow’s foreign policy: overestimating agreements, underestimating adversaries, and failing to create enduring realities on the ground.

The Ukraine crisis of 2004 marked the beginning of the West’s relentless encroachment into Russia’s sphere of influence. NATO’s expansion and an orchestrated campaign of russophobia, funded through so-called “independent” Western media, were left largely unchallenged by Moscow. Instead of taking proactive measures, Russia maintained agreements and supplied cheap gas, inadvertently enabling the forces that sought to undermine it.

By 2014, this naivety culminated in the Maidan coup, the Odessa massacre, and the establishment of an openly hostile regime in Kiev. Critics at the time warned that decisive intervention to secure Donbass—or even all of Ukraine—could have preempted the conflict. Yet Moscow instead placed its faith in the Minsk Agreements, later exposed as a Western ploy to buy time while militarizing Ukraine.

When the Special Military Operation (SMO) began in 2022, it mirrored this pattern of minimalism. Moscow sought negotiations with adversaries whose duplicity had already been laid bare, only to find itself drawn into a prolonged conflict. Two years later, the outcome is a protracted conflict, marked by unrelenting hostilities and an ever-looming threat of escalation into nuclear confrontation.

The same miscalculation is evident in Syria. After years of hard-fought gains, the Syrian government, with Russian and Iranian support, reclaimed vast swathes of territory from Turkish-backed Takfiri forces. Millions of lives were stabilized, hope was restored, and the groundwork for a lasting resolution was within reach. Yet Moscow chose to stop short, relying on the Astana Agreements to manage Turkey’s involvement. Predictably, Ankara exploited the agreement, using it to regroup its proxies and entrench its influence in Syria.

The consequences are now playing out in real-time: Turkey’s Takfiri proxies have seized Aleppo and advanced to take Hama in just days, rolling back years of progress. Despite Turkey’s repeated duplicity—arming Ukraine, backtracking on the Azov prisoner deal, and training militants for its Idlib campaign—Moscow has failed to recalibrate its approach. Instead, it remains tethered to agreements with partners whose actions consistently undermine Russia and its allies.

Compounding this pattern of strategic miscalculation is Moscow’s persistent reliance on hope for negotiations with unreliable actors. Today, its apparent belief in the prospect of a future Trump administration reversing these dynamics ignores Trump’s record of inconsistency, from arming Ukraine to occupying Syria’s oil fields. This reflects a broader unwillingness to accept the realities of adversarial intent and take the necessary steps to secure Russia’s interests decisively.

The past two decades are littered with examples of Moscow’s strategic gullibility, where misplaced trust in unreliable counterparts has led to repeated crises. These crises were not inevitable but were born from a refusal to prioritize tangible action over the illusion of partnership. The price of this hesitation has been borne not only by Russia but also by its allies, who have suffered the consequences of agreements that were, from the outset, unworthy of trust.

It is time for Moscow to abandon its illusions and embrace a strategy grounded in realpolitik—one that prioritizes creating immutable facts on the ground over fleeting diplomatic appearances. Without decisive action, the Kremlin risks perpetuating the very crises its adversaries so adeptly exploit.