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Joined 10 months ago
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Cake day: April 4th, 2025

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  • A reasonable argument and I agree that impersonation is still possible without the scammer taking the excact username but it’ll still be easier to fool your contacts when you don’t have an active account.

    For example consider two worlds - in one you have an instagram account, in the other you don’t. The world in which you have the account, people who only know you through that account and don’t use other platforms where you’re on, are less likely to fall victim to scams because they can always verify that the scammers account isn’t your account. In the other world this isn’t possible and thus it is more likely people who don’t know you directly will believe the scammer.

    Also my point on the cost of the account still stands. I do admit that having an open account which gets scraped is an issue but if you have a “private” account, most of the 3rd parties lose access to it’s content. Although I’m sure three letter agencies and meta have a custom API which can query all accounts, public or private, the point you’re trying to make is moot, as if we’re talking about opsec, if you already have an (insta) account, all it’s data is logged somewhere and it likely won’t be deleted in the near future.


  • Unlike most other messengers, Delta Chat apps do not store any metadata about contacts or groups on servers, also not in encrypted form. Instead, all group metadata is end-to-end encrypted and stored on end-user devices, only. Servers can therefore only see:

    • the sender and receiver addresses and
    • the message size.

    By default, the addresses are randomly generated. All other message, contact and group metadata resides in the end-to-end encrypted part of messages.

    https://delta.chat/en/help#message-metadata

    > Doesn’t store any metadata on servers

    > Servers still see the sender and reciever and the message size

    Explain how this is not contradictory.

    Furthermore my original argument on protocol blocking still stands (if almost all communication platforms rely on a widely used protocol, the blocking of which is infeasble, then how is this a feature noone else besides deltachat has).

    And as the FAQ brilliantly illustrates, you don’t have to block the mail protocol to inhibit deltachat users from communicating. All you have to do, is just shut down the relays which are crucial to masking your metadata.

    Speaking of relays, all they do is transfer the trust. Without using relays you have to trust that normal mail servers wont’t log your activity (they do). With relays you have to trust that the relay operators won’t log your activity.


  • Deltachat can’t be considered as private as Signal, SimpleX, Briar, Threema or Cwtch due to the fact that it’s based on the mail protocol. The mail protocol will always leak metadata (who, to whom, where and when) because it could’t function otherwise. And because we live in a world of surveillence, metadata can be oftentimes more valuable than the message itself.

    Also saying that deltachat is unblockable because it is based on the mail protocol would be the same as saying that every app utilizing VOIP is unblockable because it uses the TCP/IP stack and blocking it would render the internet unusuable.









  • While I agree with the overall premise, it’s not a great article. The author just quotes facts while drawing no relevant conclusions or wrong conclusions.

    The fact that there is fraud in Estonia, like any other country, is, I imagine, due to people being stupid. In my country most fraud cases are grandmas handing off their pensions to randos to help their grandchild escape prison or to help with a super secret government mission to catch thieves. Similar to the classic Nigerian prince schemes. Not once does the author mention how digital ID’s are connected to fraud or how they enabled money laundering.

    I hope that the author is just not that great of a writer and not malicious because throwing in scary statistics and names like Palantir without making any conclusion as to how digital ID’s could exarcebate the problem, really feels like fearmongering.

    Nevertheless, I quite liked the website design and the extensive quotation of sources.


  • Holy hell! Didn’t imagine him being that far right. Always thought the accusations were half made-up.
    It’s always sad to see promising FOSS projects taint their image with deplorable political views or behaviour (Hyprland, GNU, GrapheneOS, probably some others). Although I believe in freedom of opinion, I draw the line on inciting violence and hatred against minorities. Also, I can’t fathom why he would still use Xitter, when so many better alternatives exist?





  • It isn’t as hard as people imagine it to be. For starters you could watch a few entertaining videos by MentalOutlaw or listen to Opt Out and Watchman Privacy podcast.

    When you feel more at home with the terminology and understand the basic process behind cryptocurrencies in general and Monero, you could get a wallet, look some at some of their recommended guides, buy some Bitcoin at a decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) exchange, trade it for Monero and badabim badaboom - you now have Monero.

    I recommend either Haveno Reto or Bisq. Nevertheless, always do your own research and make your own choice. This is a good place to start.

    You can use centralized exchanges as well as they make the process a bit easier but then you have to KYC yourself. Which isn’t a big problem because when you trade Bitcoin to Monero, all following transactions are anonymous.

    If you want to go hardcore from the start, you could use decentralized P2P exchange to get Monero for cash but this is a bit more advanced and comes with a premium.