• 0 Posts
  • 53 Comments
Joined 11 months ago
cake
Cake day: July 31st, 2023

help-circle


  • I already commented this on another post about chat control but I still stand by what I said before so imma be a dick and put the original comment here as well:

    Imagine there’s one phone type with one security level. And now they introduce a second phone. It has less security. Now everyone has to switch to the weaker phone.

    Soooo, now who gets the stronger phones? Government employees? The military? Politicians? Agencies?

    The less the strong phones you give out, the more authoritarian the measure. But the more the strong phones you give out, the higher the chance of misuse or mishandling. You will now have a black market for secure phones, giving them out to criminals. You will now have people with strong phones having a higher right of privacy, giving them more protection against the state itself.

    Now let’s add more factors. Someone loses their stronger phone. We now have a potentially untraceable strong phone. The government is losing control over those. Now you have 5 different tiers of secure phones. But people are people and the more complicated, the more things can go wrong. Now let’s add in slightly more authoritarian states like Hungary. There’s a good chance they will instantly start spying on journalists. Or give opposition parties the weaker phones by accident.

    Now add in foreign agencies. China’s digital government agencies are very efficient. Imagine they get the keys to the weaker phones. Great, now China can effectively monitor 99% of the EU. And now even if an EU member has a strong phone, they just listen in his wife’s phone, and they get the information anyway. Now what about if a spy from North Korea gets the keys and starts finding bank information on the stronger phones? They now have new super annoying ways of stealing billions of dollars from the EU and covertly as well if they do it right.

    As you can see, making some people’s security weaker on purpose is a lose lose game. It never works. There’s way too many cooks in the kitchen in the EU for this kind of stuff to stay in line, and there WILL be misuse, one way or the other.



  • Imagine there’s one phone type with one security level. And now they introduce a second phone. It has less security. Now everyone has to switch to the weaker phone.

    Soooo, now who gets the stronger phones? Government employees? The military? Politicians? Agencies?

    The less the strong phones you give out, the more authoritarian the measure. But the more the strong phones you give out, the higher the chance of misuse or mishandling. You will now have a black market for secure phones, giving them out to criminals. You will now have people with strong phones having a higher right of privacy, giving them more protection against the state itself.

    Now let’s add more factors. Someone loses their stronger phone. We now have a potentially untraceable strong phone. The government is losing control over those. Now you have 5 different tiers of secure phones. But people are people and the more complicated, the more things can go wrong. Now let’s add in slightly more authoritarian states like Hungary. There’s a good chance they will instantly start spying on journalists. Or give opposition parties the weaker phones by accident.

    Now add in foreign agencies. China’s digital government agencies are very efficient. Imagine they get the keys to the weaker phones. Great, now China can effectively monitor 99% of the EU. And now even if an EU member has a strong phone, they just listen in his wife’s phone, and they get the information anyway. Now what about if a spy from North Korea gets the keys and starts finding bank information on the stronger phones? They now have new super annoying ways of stealing billions of dollars from the EU and covertly as well if they do it right.

    As you can see, making some people’s security weaker on purpose is a lose lose game. It never works. There’s way too many cooks in the kitchen in the EU for this kind of stuff to stay in line, and there WILL be misuse, one way or the other.





  • Well I can tell you what’s happening right now because of Chevron deference and it’s stupid af.

    Look at Sackett v EPA 2022: a couple bought a lot,began filling up the ground with dirt to a lay foundation. The EPA stepped in, declared the stuff they filled up to be “Waters of the United States” and found they had violated environmental protection regulations. We’re not talking river, lake or God forbid, an ocean. We’re talking somewhere between small water body and puddle.

    Why were they able to do that? Chevron deference meant that the EPA in this case is not clear on the exact definition surrounding this water body. So they decided it’s included in the “Waters of the United States”. You know the worst part? If a court rules differently on the definition, they are allowed to discard that definition and instead use their own.

    And this is what I mean. There’s no reason to give agency such broad unchecked power. Now even though this water dispute is annoying for the couple, it’s rather silly on paper. Now imagine the same with the NSA or CIA. Suddenly this is not as silly anymore.

    There’s a great Livestream on YouTube where a well versed lawyer gives a quick overview on that case and why Chevron deference is so dangerous but unfortunately I can’t find it anymore.

    The bottom line is, you can’t ask agencies to defer to a court before making any small decision, but you also can’t just let them make their own legal definitions. There has to be something in between. It’s not working rn.